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Abstract—Detection and mitigation of Security Vulnerabilities
(SVs) are integral tasks in software development and main-
tenance. Software developers often explore developer Question
and Answer (Q&A) websites to find solutions for securing their
software. However, there is empirically little known about the
on-going SV-related discussions and how the Q&A sites are
supporting such discussions. To demystify such mysteries, we
conduct large-scale qualitative and quantitative experiments to
study the characteristics of 67,864 SV-related posts on Stack
Overflow (SO) and Security StackExchange (SSE). We first find
that the existing SV categorization of formal security sources
is not frequently used on Q&A sites. Therefore, we use Latent
Dirichlet Allocation topic modeling to extract a new taxonomy
of thirteen SV discussion topics on Q&A sites. We then study
the characteristics of such SV topics. Brute-force/Timing Attacks
and Vulnerability Testing are found the most popular and difficult
topics, respectively. We discover that despite having higher user
expertise than other domains, the difficult SV topics do not gain
as much attention from experienced users as the more popular
ones. Seven types of answers to SV-related questions are also iden-
tified on Q&A sites, in which SO usually gives instructions and
code, while SSE provides more explanations and/or experience-
based advice. Our findings can help practitioners and researchers
to utilize Q&A sites more effectively to learn and share SV
knowledge.
Index Terms—security vulnerability, natural language pro-
cessing, topic modeling, software maintenance, mining software
repositories
I. INTRODUCTION
Security Vulnerability (SV) is a flaw that can pose security
risks to a software system [1]. There is an apparent need for
discovering, understanding and mitigating such SVs to main-
tain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of software
systems during its evolution [2]–[5]. Formal security sources
such as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [6],
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [7], Common Weak-
ness Enumeration (CWE) [8] and Open Web Application
Security Project (OWASP) [9] provide information about SVs
and their characteristics vetted by security experts. These
sources also allow vendors to give comments on the SV
fixing status of their affected products [10]. However, they do
not provide any associated websites/platforms for end-users
to discuss the reported vulnerabilities in real-life software
development.
For instance, CWE provides the definition of SQL-injection
vulnerability and then suggests solutions to mitigate such
vulnerability in PHP and C [11]. However, these websites
do not mention to what extent such recommendations are
being applied in real-life scenarios. Moreover, these formal
sources do not readily guide developers how to prevent/fix
(SQL-injection) SVs in other languages such as Node.js to
avoid “reinventing the wheel” in software development and
maintenance. In contrast, plenty of such discussions (e.g.,
recent remediation practices of SQL injection in PHP [12] and
Node.js [13]) can be found on Question and Answer (Q&A)
websites like Stack Exchange [14] with more than nineteen
million posts and ten million users.
Among the sites on Stack Exchange, Stack Overflow
(SO) [15] and Security StackExchange (SSE) [16] are the
largest general and security-focused ones for developers, re-
spectively. These two Q&A sites cover different aspects of
software development lifecycle, including the maintenance
and enhancement of software security. In the literature, the
main concepts and their characteristics [17], the top lan-
guages/technologies and user demographics [18], as well as
user perceptions and interactions [19], [20] of general se-
curity discussions on SO have been studied. However, no
emphasis has been put on the discussions about potential
SVs in a software system. For instance, authentication is an
important security requirement to enforce different levels of
access/permission, but credentials of an authentication process
may be vulnerable to timing or brute-force attacks. The
prevention of such SVs would reduce the security risks for
a software system. There is not yet an in-depth understand-
ing of the knowledge about security flaws being exchanged
on these Q&A websites and their correlation with formal
security sources. Specifically, there is no existing study on
the common SV questions as well as the likelihood/duration
of getting answers, expertise and answer kinds received for
such questions on developer Q&A websites. Therefore, we
would like to demystify these mysteries to answer the question
“To what extent do developer Q&A websites support
SV discussion?” Such knowledge can enable inexperienced
users to seek solutions for SVs more effectively on Q&A
sites. Experienced users can also identify the areas that they
can contribute their expertise to assist the secure software
engineering community.
We use mixed methods that combine topic modeling using
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [21] with statistical and
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qualitative analyses to investigate SV discussion on developer
Q&A websites. We conduct a large-scale empirical study on
67,864 SV-related posts on SO and SSE. Our main findings
are:
• Q&A sites rarely refer to formal security sources and
categories. They also do not have similar rankings of SVs
as the top-25 CWE and top-10 OWASP, requiring new
taxonomy to study SV discussion on these sites.
• Using LDA, we identify thirteen SV topics on SO and
SSE. Memory-related errors and conceptual/network SVs
are prevalent on SO and SSE, respectively. Cross-site
Request Forgery is also increasing fast over time.
• Brute-force/Timing Attacks attracts the most attention
(i.e., most popular topic), while Vulnerability Testing is
the most difficult to obtain answers on Q&A sites.
• Answerers’ expertise for SV questions is 1.3 to 5.7 times
higher than other domains such as general security, big
data and mobile development. However, the knowledge
sharing of such answerers between Q&A sites is still
limited (< 18%). Experienced users also favor popu-
lar/prevalent topics over difficult ones. On average, SV
expertise on SO is also higher than SSE.
• There are seven primary ways to answer SV questions on
Q&A sites with more instruction/code-based solutions on
SO and more explanatory ones on SSE.
In brief, our key contributions are as follows:
1) We are the first to investigate the relationship of SV
discussion on Q&A sites and formal security sources.
2) We identify thirteen key SV topics on SO and SSE.
3) We conduct a large-scale study on the characteristics
(i.e., popularity, difficulty, expertise and answer types)
of each SV topic on Q&A sites along with their impli-
cations for practitioners and researchers.
4) We curate and release a large and contemporary dataset
of SV discussions on Q&A sites at [22].
Paper structure. Section II introduces SV discussion on
Q&A sites and SV information on formal security sources.
Section III describes the five research questions along with
the methods and data used in this work. Sections IV presents
the results of each research question. Section V presents the
discussion of the findings and threats to validity. Section VI
covers the related work. Section VII concludes and suggests
future directions.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
A. Security Vulnerability Posts on Q&A Websites
The format of a discussion post on Question and Answer
(Q&A) websites like Stack Overflow (SO) is described in
Fig. 1. It is noted that Security StackExchange (SSE) also
shares the same post format as SO. A post usually contains
a unique identification (id), title, question, a list of tags and
zero or more answer along with community metrics such as the
number of views, likes (score) and favorites. The questioner
can select the tags from an existing list as well as specify
one an-swer as the best/accepted one. A post also has the
...
Creation date Last active date
Number of views
Title
Question body
Tags
Number of answers
Answer body
Accepted/Best answer
Favorite 
count
Score
Owner
Last edit 
date
Fig. 1. Format of an SV post (id 110575) on Stack Overflow [27]. Note:
Minor edits have been made for readability.
information about the questioner/answerers as well as the dates
of creation, answers, edits and last activity. We would utilize
these components of a discussion post for both retrieving and
analyzing Security Vulnerability (SV) related posts on these
Q&A websites.
We consider a post to be related to SV when it mainly
discusses a security flaw and/or exploitation/testing/fixing of
such flaw to compromise a software system (e.g., the post
29098142 on SO [23]). A post is not SV-related if it just
discusses how to implement/use a security feature (e.g., the
post 685855 on SO [24]) without any explicit mention of a
flaw. However, the non-SV post 685855 has the same tags
php and authentication as the SV post 29098142. Therefore,
we cannot solely rely on the tags of a post to determine its SV
relevance. Another example is the post 3226374 on SO [25]
that discusses SQL-injection SV in PHP with only the php tag
and no SV-specific tag. On the other hand, the post 38539393
on SO [26] is incorrectly tagged with stack-overflow, whilst
the main discussion is about saving data in Python using a for
loop. These issues demand a robust method for the retrieval
of SV posts.
B. Security Vulnerability Intelligence on Security Sources
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [6] and
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [7] are the two
well-known sources that publish expert-verified intelligence
about SVs on a continual basis. Besides the description and
unique id from CVE, NVD adds more information related
to the category based on Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE) [8] and characteristics (e.g., impact, exploitation and
severity) based on Common Vulnerability Scoring System
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(CVSS) [28]. Besides CWE, Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) [9] is another well-regarded source that
reports the most dangerous types of SVs in web applications.
The aforementioned ranking and characterization systems are
essential to help security experts as well as software developers
and testers to prioritize their countermeasures against a large
amount of new SVs. For instance, a more severe SV is likely
to be fixed first to avoid critical security threats to the affected
software systems.
Despite the reliable information provided, formal security
sources do not support any open platforms for end-users to
discuss how to discover and mitigate the reported SVs in
practice (e.g., in different programming languages or tech-
nologies). In contrast, Q&A websites like SO and SSE have a
plethora of such discussions, and they are used extensively by
developers for software development and maintenance [29]. To
our best knowledge, there is no existing work that establishes
connections between the SV discussion on Q&A sites and
the information on formal security sources such as NVD,
CVE, CWE and OWASP. The characteristics and dynamics of
such SV discussions are also largely unexplored. These gaps
have motivated us to investigate the state-of-the-practice of SV
knowledge crowdsourcing on Q&A websites.
III. CASE STUDY SETUP
A. Research Questions and Methodology
We aim to answer five Research Questions (RQs) to provide
a thorough picture of how Q&A websites are supporting
Security Vulnerability (SV) related discussions, and correlate
such practices with those in NVD, CVE, CWE and OWASP.
For each RQ, we also analyze the difference between a general
Q&A website (Stack Overflow (SO)) and a security-centric
one (Security StackExchange (SSE)). To answer these RQs,
we first propose methods in section III-B based on both the
tags and content of posts to retrieve 67,864 SV posts from SO
and SSE. We implemented our work in Python on a system
run-ning Intel Core i7-4200HQ CPU with 16 GB of RAM.
RQ1: Are SV discussions on Q&A sites in sync with
formal security sources? RQ1 examines the suitability of
applying existing security taxonomies (e.g., CWE and OWASP
categorization) to analyze SV discussion on Q&A websites.
More specifically, we adopt keyword matching techniques
to count the number of mentions of security sources, the
frequency of the top SV types (i.e., the top-25 CWE [30]
and top-10 OWASP [31]) as well as the top vulnerable
products and vendors in the titles, questions, answers and
tags of the extracted SV posts. For the top-10 OWASP, we
also consider their sub-level CWEs [32] for matching to
increase the coverage since the original ten CWEs of OWASP
are very infrequent. Then, we compare the orders on Q&A
websites with their corresponding rankings on formal security
sources. Interestingly, we have found in section IV-A that
Q&A sites do not coherently follow the practices of the formal
sources, which inhibits the use of such existing taxonomies for
exploring SV discussion on Q&A sites.
RQ2: What are SV discussion topics on Q&A sites?
The existing security categories are found too scarce and
inconsistent to describe SV-related discussions on Q&A sites
in RQ1; thus, we need to devise a new taxonomy to study
the main SV themes on these sites. Following the practices
of existing works [17], [33], RQ2 uses topic modeling with
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [21] and manual valida-
tion (see section III-C) to semi-automatically select the most
interpretable set of SV discussion topics. Such topics would
give insights into how to post relevant questions about SVs on
Q&A sites. Moreover, we use the topic share metric [33] in
Eq. (1) to compute the proportion of each SV topic and their
evolution from 2008 to 2019.
sharei = 1N
∑
p∈D
LDA(p, Ti) (1)
where D and N are the SV posts and the number of such posts,
respectively; Ti is ith topic and LDA is the trained LDA model.
It should be noted that sharei would not add up to 100% since
we discard topics with an assignment probability < 0.1 for
each post (see section III-C). We can use sharei to compute
the count (sharei ×N ) of each topic, but it would be hard to
interpret the popularity/difficulty (RQ3) and reputation (RQ4)
of partial topics. Therefore, we only consider the topic with
the highest probability of each post to determine the number
of posts per topic (|Ti|), which is defined in Eq. (2).
|Ti| =
∑
p∈D
zip (z
i
p = 1 if i = argmax(LDA(p)), else z
i
p = 0) (2)
RQ3: What are the popular and difficult SV topics on
Q&A sites? After the SV topics are identified, RQ3 identifies
the most popular and difficult topics on Q&A websites. RQ3
is necessary to select the suitable (i.e., more popular and less
difficult) Q&A site for respective SV topics. To quantify the
topic popularity, we used four question-centric metrics adapted
from [17], [34], namely (i) the number of views (P1), (ii)
scores (upvotes minus downvotes) (P2), (iii) favorites (P3)
and (iv) comments (P4). The hypothesis is that a popular
topic would attract more attention (views), interest (scores
and favorites) and activities (comments) from participants. We
then determine the unified popularity of a topic using Eq. (3),
which produces consistent results from constituent metrics.
The topic popularity is different from the count (|Ti|) in RQ2
since a topic with many posts does not necessarily gain as
much interest as other topics with fewer posts. This has been
demonstrated in section IV-C.
Popularityi =
1
|Ti|
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√∑
P1i ×
∑
P2i ×
∑
P3i ×
∑
P4i (3)
where i is the ith topic, while
∑
P1i,
∑
P2i,
∑
P3i,
∑
P4i
are the popularity metrics of the posts of that topic. Geometric
mean is utilized instead of arithmetic mean here since the
metrics can have different units/scales.
∑
P2i can have non-
positive value, but we did not encounter any such case in our
work.
To measure the topic difficulty, we use the following three
metrics combined from [17], [34]: (i) whether the current
question gets an accepted answer (D1), (ii) time (hours) to
3
receive an accepted answer since posted (D2), and (iii) the
number of answers per the number of views (D3). Then, we
propose the unified difficulty of a topic to be calculated with
Eq. (4).
Difficultyi =
3
√
|Ti|∑
D1i
×
∑
D2i
|Ti|Accept. ×
|Ti|Accept.∑
D3i
= 3
√
|Ti|×
∑
D2i∑
D1i×
∑
D3i
(4)
where i and |Ti|Accept. are the ith topic and the number of
posts with accepted answer of that topic, while
∑
D1i,
∑
D2i,∑
D3i, are the corresponding difficulty metrics of the posts
of that topic.
Accordingly, a more difficult topic (i.e., with a larger value
of Difficultyi) would, on average, take a longer time to obtain
accepted answers and have a lower ratio of answers to views.
It is worth noting that we only consider the posts with accepted
answer so that D2 can have valid values.
RQ4: Are there experts to answer SV questions on Q&A
sites? RQ4 continues to check the level of expertise available
on Q&A websites to answer SV questions, especially the ones
of difficult topics. The findings of RQ4 would shed light on
which topic may require more attention from the experts.
We utilize two types of metrics to quantify the general and
specific expertise. Regarding the general expertise, we use the
reputation points [35] of users who got the accepted answers
since reputation is gained through one’s active participation
and appreciation from the Q&A community. A low value of
reputation implies that the questions of a topic are not of
much interest to experienced users, and vice versa. However,
reputation is not specific to any topic, and thus it does not
correctly reflect whether a user is experienced with a topic.
Hence, we propose a new metric in Eq. (5) to automatically
approximate a user’s specific expertise with respect to a topic
of interest.
Specific Expertise =
∑
p∈D
LDA(Q(p)) LDA(K(UAccept.))
K(UAccept.) = A
1
UAccept. +A
2
UAccept. + ...+A
k
UAccept.(k =
∣∣AUAccept. ∣∣ )
(5)
where Q(p) and K(UAccept.) are the question content and SV
knowledge of the user UAccept. who gave the accepted answer
of the post p, respectively.  is the topic-wise multiplication.∣∣AUAccept.∣∣ is all SV-related answers given by user UAccept..
Specifically, for each question with an accepted answer, we
first extract the user that gave such answer (UAccept.). We then
gather all answers, not necessarily accepted, of that user in
SV posts (
∣∣AUAccept.∣∣). Such answer list is the SV knowledge
of UAccept. (K(UAccept.)). We do not average topic of answers
since LDA does not work well with short text [36], [37].
Finally, we compute the LDA topic-wise correlation between
the current SV question (LDA(Q(p))) and the user knowledge
(LDA(K(UAccept.))) to determine the user expertise matching
for a post p.
RQ5: What types of answers are given to SV questions on
Q&A sites? Besides the expertise in RQ4, RQ5 extends RQ2
in terms of the solution types given if an SV question is an-
swered on Q&A sites. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to investigate the answer types of SV on Q&A sites. We
employ the open card sorting method [38] to identify answer
types. LDA is not suitable for this purpose since it relies on the
word co-occurrences to determine the categories. In contrast,
the same type of solutions may not share any similar words.
In RQ5, we only consider the posts with accepted answer
to ensure the high quality and relevance of the answers. We
then use stratified sampling to randomly select 385 posts (95%
confidence level with 5% margin error [39]) each from SO and
SSE for two authors to independently categorize the answer
types. Stratification ensures the proportion of each topic is
maintained. After the labelling process, if there is a conflict,
the third author would be involved to decide the categories.
Here, we do not measure the Kappa inter-rater score [40] as
the labels are open coded. We also report the proportion of
each answer type and correlate them with the question types
on SO [41].
B. Security Vulnerability Post Collection
In order to study the characteristics of Security Vulnerability
(SV)-related discussion on Q&A websites, we first need to
obtain a reliable and large collection of posts related to
SV. However, it is not trivial to retrieve such posts since
many SV posts are tagged with general tags (e.g., post id
3226374 on SO mentioned in section II-A) and SV-related
tags are not straightforward to obtain. Therefore, we propose
a unified workflow (see Fig. 2) to obtain, to the best of our
knowledge, the largest and most contemporary set of SV posts
on both SO and SSE. Specifically, we propose tag-based
and content-based filtering to retrieve SV posts based on
their tags and content of other parts (i.e., title, body and
answers), respectively. All the identified tags, keywords and
posts mentioned in this section have been released at [22].
Tag-based filtering. Existing works usually used a represen-
tative tag (e.g., security for security [17], multithreading for
concurrency [42] and apache-spark/hadoop for big data [34])
to identify more relevant tags and then obtain posts with
those tags accordingly. However, we do not have any such
a tag for SV to start with on SO. Therefore, we propose
to use Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) to define the
relevant tags. However, the full CWE titles are usually long
and uncommonly used in the context of online discussion. For
example, the fully-qualified name of SQL-injection in CWE
(CWE-89) is “Improper Neutralization of Special Elements
used in an SQL Command (‘SQL Injection’)”, which appears
only nine times on SO and SSE. Therefore, we need to extract
shorter and more common terms from the full CWE titles. We
adopt Part-of-Speech (POS) tagging for this purpose, in which
we only consider consecutive (n-grams of) verbs, nouns and
adjectives since most of them convey the main meaning of
a title. For instance, we would obtain the following 2-gram
terms for CWE-89: improper neutralization, special elements,
elements used, sql command, sql injection. To ensure the
relevance of these terms, we only consider the terms that
appear at least once on either SO or SSE.
After the filtering process, we have obtained 2,591 n-gram
(1 ≤ n ≤ 3) terms. We used such terms to identify the
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t t All SV posts =
settag + setcontentt t t
Preprocess keywords
1. Filter
settag
Fig. 2. Workflow of retrieving the posts related to SV on Q&A websites using tag-based and content-based filtering heuristics.
TABLE I
CONTENT-BASED THRESHOLDS (aSO/SSE & bSO/SSE ) FOR THE TWO STEPS
USING THE CONTENT-BASED FILTERING AS ILLUSTRATED IN FIG. 2.
Threshold
Stack Overflow (SO) Security StackExchange (SSE)
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
a 1 3 2 3
b 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.025
SV-related (anchor) tags as well as develop our list of SV
keywords (described in the content-based filtering below).
Specifically, we have found 54 and 60 anchor tags on SO and
SSE, respectively. We then determine the relevant co-occurrent
tags with the anchor tags using two tag-based metrics [17],
[34], [42]: Relevance (Rel) and Proportion (Prop) as defined
in Eq. (6).
Rel =
|tagj∩anchor tags|
|tagj | , P rop =
|tagj∩anchor tags|
|anchor tags| (6)
where |.| is the frequency of tag appearance, while ∩ means tag
co-occurrence. It is also noted that we consider co-occurrence
of the current tagj with at least one of the anchor tags.
Subsequently, we select the tags whose Rel ≥ Thre1SO/SSE
and Prop ≥ Thre2SO/SSE for both SO and SSE. Based on
manual cross-checking with two authors, we have adopted
Thre1SO = 0.35, Thre1SSE = 0.56, Thre2SO = 0.0008
and Thre2SSE = 0.005. With such thresholds, we have got
six (malware-detection, zap, antixsslibrary, esapi, stack-smash
and django-csrf ) and three (sqlmap, exploit-development and
antimalware) more relevant tags for SO and SSE. In total, we
have obtained 60 and 63 SV-related tags for these two sites,
respectively.
Through manual checking, we have found that the posts
containing at least one of these tags were not sufficiently
refined, mostly due to the improper assignment of tags (e.g.,
post id 38539393 on SO as mentioned in section II-A). We
have also noticed that the content of such posts usually did not
refer to the context of SV. Therefore, we have decided to use
content-based filtering to refine such posts as well as obtain
more posts that are not correctly associated with SV tags.
Content-based filtering. As depicted in Fig. 2, this fil-
tering step is used to refine the settag obtained from the
previous tag-based filtering step and select missing SV
posts that were not associated with SV tags. First, we
present the up-to-date list of SV keywords that contains
643 terms. These keywords are preprocessed with stemming
and augmented with American/British spellings, space/hyphen
to better handle various types of (mis-)spellings/plurality.
For instance, we consider the following variants: input(-
)sanitization/sanit/sanitisation/sanitis for “input sanitization”.
Similar to [43], we also perform exact matching for three-
character keywords and subword matching for longer ones
to reduce the false positives. Subsequently, for each settag
(SO and SSE) obtained in the tag-based filtering step, we
compute two content-based metrics (see Eq. (7)): kw count
and kw ratio, denoting the count and appearance proportion
of SV keywords in a post, respectively. Kw count ensures
diverse SV-related content in a post, while kw ratio increases
the confidence that these relevant words do not appear by
chance.
kw countp = |SV KWsp| , kw ratiop = |SV KWsp||Wordsp| (7)
where |SV KWsp| and |Wordsp| are the numbers of SV
keywords and total number of words in post p, respectively.
Based on the post content and human inspection, the thresh-
olds aSO/SSE and bSO/SSE for filtering settag (step 1) as well as
selecting extra posts based on their content (step 2) are found
and given in Table I. Using these thresholds, we obtain settag
and setcontent of SV posts on SO and SSE, respectively, as
shown in Fig. 2.
SV dataset and validation. As of December 31, 2019, we
have retrieved 18,850,888 and 55,867 posts from SO and SSE,
respectively, using StackExchange Data Explorer [44]. After
that, we have applied the proposed tag-based and content-
based filtering steps illustrated in Fig. 2 and obtained 67,864
SV posts (see Table II) in total including 53,078 and 14,786
ones for settag and setcontent, respectively. We have performed
manual validation on four different sets of SV posts (i.e.,
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TABLE II
THE OBTAINED SV POSTS USING OUR TAG-BASED AND CONTENT-BASED
FILTERING HEURISTICS.
Stack Overflow
(SO)
Security
StackExchange (SSE) SO + SSE
Settag 43,886 9,192 53,078
Setcontent 12,131 2,655 14,786
Total 56,017 11,847 67,864
TABLE III
TOP-5 TAGS OF SV, SECURITY AND GENERAL POSTS ON
SO AND SSE (IN PARENTHESES).
Order SV posts Security posts General posts
1 memory-leaks(malware)
security
(encryption)
javascript
(encryption)
2 segmentation-fault(web-application) encryption (tls) java (tls)
3 php (xss) php (authentication) c# (authentication)
4 c (exploit) java (passwords) php (passwords)
5 security (penetration-test)
cryptography (web-
application)
python (certifi
cates)
settag and setcontent for SO and SSE, respectively). More
specifically, we have randomly sampled 385 posts (significant
size [39]) in each set for two authors to examine independently.
For settag , the disagreement ratio was less than 1% (7/770
cases) and only two posts were not related to SV. The
main issue was still the incorrect tag assignment (e.g., post
38539393 on SO in section II-A or post 175264 on SSE [45]
about dll injection but tagged with malware), though this issue
had been significantly reduced by the content-based filtering.
For setcontent, the relevance of the posts was very high as
there was no discrepant case. It is worth noting that our SV
dataset was only 20% overlapping with the existing security
dataset [17], implying that there are significant differences in
the nature of the two studies. We also report the top tags of
SV posts (see Table III) and compare them with the ones of
security posts [17] and a subset of all the posts containing
an equal number of posts to the SV posts on SO and SSE.
SV posts were associated with many SV-related tags (e.g.,
memory-leaks, malware, segmentation-fault, xss, exploit and
penetration-test). Conversely, security posts were tagged with
general terms that may not explicitly discuss security flaws
such as security, encryption, authentication and passwords.
The tags of general posts were also mostly programming
languages on SO and general security terms on SSE. These
findings highlight the importance of obtaining specific posts
instead of reusing the security posts to study SV.
C. Topic Modeling with Latent Dirichlet Allocation
Inspired by the existing works (e.g., [17], [33], [34]), we
extract the topics of SV-related posts identified in section III-B
using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [21]. LDA assumes
that a document contains words generated from a list of latent
topics. Specifically, LDA decomposes a Q&A-post matrix
(Pn×|V |, where n is the number of posts and |V | is the
word vocabulary of such posts) into a document-topic matrix
(Tn×k) and a topic-word matrix (Wk×|V |). We present two
main steps required for topic modeling: (i) preprocess SV
posts and (ii) identify the optimal topics with LDA, which
are described in detail hereafter.
Preprocessing of SV posts. The first step is to preprocess
posts to avoid noise in the text, which helps a topic model
to identify more relevant words of each topic. Following the
previous practices (e.g., [17], [42]), we first remove the HTML
tags as well as code snippets in the question and answer
bodies of each post. We also convert the text to lowercase
and remove punctuations. We then eliminate stop words [22]
and perform stemming using the Porter algorithm [46] to
avoid irrelevant and multi-form words. We implemented the
preprocessing steps with the support of the sklearn [47] and
nltk [48] libraries.
Topic modeling with LDA. Due to the unsupervised nature
of LDA, it is challenging to determine in advance how many
latent topics are required to generate the document words.
Therefore, we examine the number of topics (k) in an inclusive
range from 2 to 80, with an increment of one topic at
a time. For each k, we evaluate the coherence [49] and
interpretability of the identified topics. We used the Gensim
library with the default configurations [50] for implementing
LDA models and calculating the coherence metric. To avoid
insignificant topics as in [33], we only consider topics with
a probability of at least 0.1 in a post. Subsequently, for
each set of topics, topic coherence automatically computes
the average correlation between pairs of words that appear
in the same context/topic. Intuitively, the higher value of the
coherence metric means the more coherent content of the posts
within a same topic. It is worth noting that the topics also
become more fine-grained as the number of topics increases.
Therefore, two authors need to independently validate the
identified topics to remove platform/technology/tool-specific
ones that may reduce the generalizability of our SV taxonomy.
To check the interpretability of a topic, we consider the top-
20 most frequent words of each topic and twenty random
posts of the current topic obtained by the trained LDA models.
We also follow the same procedure to assign the names for
the optimal topics. It should be noted that the coherence
metric is still useful to locate the region of the good (highly
coherent) number of topics. After the topic modeling process,
the most relevant and interpretable set of topics will be used
for answering RQs 2 to 5 outlined in section III-A.
IV. RESULTS
A. RQ1: Are SV Discussions on Q&A Sites in Sync with
Formal Security Sources?
Firstly, Table IV shows that all the security sources were
mentioned less than 10% (i.e., on average 0.24% to 5.62%)
on both Stack Overflow (SO) and Security StackExchange
(SSE). More specifically, OWASP was the most frequently
men-tioned source, while the mentions of NVD and CWE
were nearly negligible (< 1%) on both Q&A sites. It is also
noted that SSE had more mention percentages than SO for
6
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
(a) CWE Rank minus Q&A websites Rank
CWE-295
CWE-269
CWE-502
CWE-426
CWE-772
CWE-400
CWE-798
CWE-94
CWE-611
CWE-434
CWE-732
CWE-476
CWE-287
CWE-787
CWE-78
CWE-22
CWE-352
CWE-190
CWE-416
CWE-89
CWE-125
CWE-200
CWE-20
CWE-79
CWE-119
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
(b) OWASP Rank minus Q&A websites Rank
OWASP-10
OWASP-9
OWASP-8
OWASP-7
OWASP-6
OWASP-5
OWASP-4
OWASP-3
OWASP-2
OWASP-1 SO
SO + SSE
SSE
Fig. 3. Changes in ranking order between the types of SVs on Q&A websites and the ones in the (a) top-25 CWE and (b) top-10 OWASP. Note: CWEs are
sorted by their original rankings in the top-25 CWE from top to bottom.
TABLE IV
APPEARANCE PERCENTAGE (%) OF SECURITY SOURCES IN SV-RELATED
POSTS ON Q&A WEBSITES.
Q&A site CVE NVD CWE OWASP
Stack Overflow (SO) 0.54 0.09 0.35 4.92
Security StackExchange (SSE) 6.17 0.92 0.69 8.93
Average (SO + SSE) 1.52 0.24 0.41 5.62
all sources, which is reasonable given that the user/content
is more security-oriented. Furthermore, it took a median of
343 days (nearly one year) for the SVs with CVE-ID to be
mentioned for the first time on Q&A websites. It is evident
that security sources were not commonly and promptly used
to discuss SVs on Q&A websites.
Using keyword matching mentioned in section III-A, we
also investigated the rankings of the top-25 CWE [30] and
top-10 OWASP [31] as shown in Fig. 3. Surprisingly, only
5/75 and 6/30 cases had the same ranking on Q&A websites as
the top-25 CWE and top-10 OWASP, respectively. In addition,
155 and 70 out of a total of 839 CWEs were mentioned on
SO and SSE, among which only nineteen and two CWEs
appeared more than 100 times on these two sites, respectively.
Similarly, the order of the top-50 most vulnerable products and
vendors also did not match with the ones on CVE and NVD.
Specifically, the orders of only 2/150 and 5/150 cases remained
the same for vulnerable products and vendors, respectively. On
average, the mean absolute ranking differences were 4.5, 1.5,
16.3 and 12.2 for the top-25 CWE, top-10 OWASP, top-50
products and top-50 vendors, respectively. These findings show
that SV discussion on SO and SSE did not follow the standards
and practices on formal security sources, which also supports
our argument in section III-A to devise a new taxonomy to
study SV discussions on Q&A websites.
Answers to RQ1: Security sources and categories
were not frequently mentioned on SO and SSE. The
rankings from formal security sources (e.g., the top-
25 CWE and top-10 OWASP) did not hold on these
two sites, which requires a new taxonomy to study SV
discussion on Q&A sites.
B. RQ2: What are SV Discussion Topics on Q&A Sites?
Following the procedure in section III-C, we identified
thirteen SV topics (see Table V) on Q&A sites. Specifically,
using the coherence metric, we reduced our topic search space
for manual examination to the range from 11 to 17, inclusively.
The topics before 11 and after 17 had a rapid decline in
coherence. We also found duplicate and/or platform-specific
topics (e.g., web and mobile) appeared from 14 topics, which
would not be optimal for our taxonomy (see section III-C).
11 and 12 topics were coherent, but they missed important
SV topics like Vulnerability Theory. After a discussion among
three of the authors, thirteen was chosen as the optimal number
of SV topics.
Most of the identified topics were on the software level,
except T9 that mostly affected the network and T13 partly
impacted the hardware. We manually mapped the topics with
the representative CWEs, and discovered that only seven of
them were overlapping with the top-25 CWE and top-10
OWASP, namely T2, T4, T5 (i.e., Path-traversal and Unre-
stricted File Upload), T7 (i.e., Improper Certificate Validation),
T8, T10 and T11. There was also no associated CWE for
the topics T3 and T12 since they mainly discussed the use
of SV testing/scanning tools and/or theoretical issues (e.g.,
Difference between XSS and CSRF?), respectively. These
findings further strengthen the statement made in RQ1 that
SV discussions on Q&A websites did not follow the patterns
of formal security sources.
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TABLE V
LIST OF TOPICS RELATED TO SV ON Q&A WEBSITES IDENTIFIED BY LATENT DIRICHLET ALLOCATION.
Topic Name Topic Description Key Stemmed Terms CWEs
Malwares (T1) Detection and removal of malicious code such as malwares, virusesand worms that infect devices and platforms
malwar, file, viru, infect, instal,
comput, site, websit, email, malici 506-512, 904
SQL Injection (T2) Tactics to properly neutralize and sanitize user input that can be usedto modify SQL commands and pose threats to database
sql, inject, queri, databas, string,
code, php, data, statement, input
20, 74, 89,
707, 943
Vulnerability Testing
(T3)
Automated/manual analysis and detection of potential SVs in an
application via security tools and scans
applic, test, run, window, tool, find,
issu, code, work, version –
Cross-site Request
Forgery (CSRF)
(T4)
Proper setup and configuration of web application frameworks to
prevent potential attacks; predominantly CSRF
csrf, request, token, cooki, form,
session, post, user, header, page 352, 1173
File-related
Vulnerabilities (T5)
File-related weaknesses including attack vector, exploitation and
asset, e.g., Unrestricted File Upload and Path Traversal
file, segfault, run, python, execut,
code, imag, script, linux, command
23, 34-36, 61,
434
Synchronization
Errors (T6)
SVs produced through errors in synchronization logic (usually
related to threads), particularly Deadlocks and Race Conditions
thread, deadlock, lock, process, one,
wait, condit, call, transact, updat
362, 833, 662,
667, 820, 821
Encryption Errors
(T7)
Cryptographic issues or attacks which lead to falsified authentication
or retrieval of sensitive data, e.g., Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
attack, key, password, encrypt,
server, certify, client, user, data,
secur
295, 300, 310
Resource Leaks (T8) SVs arising from improper releasement of unused memory, e.g.,out-of-memory error on Java-based applications (e.g., Android)
memori, leak, object, class, refer,
call, creat, method, code, releas 401, 404, 772
Network Attacks
(T9)
Attacks carried out over an online computer network, e.g., Denial of
Service (DoS) and IP/ARP Spoofing
server, connect, network, ip, attack,
address, service, port, packet, traffic 290, 291, 400
General Memory
Errors (T10)
SVs caused by errors in memory access, usage and control, e.g.,
Segmentation Faults and Buffer Overflows/Underflows
code, function, program, fault,
segment, memori, pointer, alloc,
call, loop
119-127, 787,
822-825, 835
Cross-site Scripting
(XSS) (T11)
Tactics to properly validate and neutralize user inputs to a web page
in order to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks
xss, javascript, html, page, browser,
script, user, code, url, tag 20, 79-87, 707
Vulnerability Theory
(T12)
Discussion and analysis of SVs concerning their exploitation,
impacts and prevention/mitigation
secur, system, vulner, attack, make,
possibl, question, need, user, know –
Brute-force / Timing
Attacks (T13)
Attacks making excessive amount of attempts or capturing the timing
of a process to yield security-relevant information (e.g., passwords)
time, hash, number, size, increase,
ram, algorithm, limit, larg, password
208, 261, 307,
385, 799, 916
Compared to an existing security taxonomy on SO [17],
we found similar topics: T2, T3, T5, T10, T11 and T13,
but we still had the following important differences. Firstly,
our topics emphasized more on security flaws, e.g., issues
with common encryption/decryption algorithms (T7) rather
than how to implement and use them. Secondly, we iden-
tified new SV-specific topics: Malwares (T1), CSRF (T4),
Synchronization (T6), Resource Leaks (T8), Network Attacks
(T9) and Vulnerability Theory (T12). Thirdly, unlike [17],
we did not consider language-dependent topics (i.e., PHP,
Flash, Javascript, Java and ASP.NET), helping our topics be
more generalizable (e.g., XSS can happen in both PHP and
ASP.NET). It is worth noting that Mansooreh et al. [51] also
devised a security taxonomy for issues on GitHub, but their
taxonomy hardly identified any specific SV types, but rather
security features and implementation.
We also analyze the proportion (share metric in Eq. (1)) as
well as the evolution trend of each topic from 2008 (SO) and
2010 (SSE) to 2019 (see Table VI). We found that the topic
patterns and dynamics of SO were different from those of SSE.
Specifically, General Memory Errors (T10) had the greatest
number of posts on SO, while Vulnerability Theory (T12)
had the largest proportion on SSE. Apart from XSS (T11)
and Brute-force/Timing Attacks (T13), we observed that topics
with many posts in one source were not common in the other
source. We discovered three consistent topic trends on both
SO and SSE, namely CSRF (T4) (increasing), File-related SVs
(T5) (increasing) and Vulnerability Theory (T12) (decreasing).
Among them, CSRF was changing with the fastest pace. Such
trends were confirmed significant with p-values < 0.05 using
Mann-Kendall non-parametric trend test [52], [53].
Answers to RQ2: Thirteen SV topics were found on
Q&A sites, many of which have not been reported in
existing studies. Memory-related topics were the most
common on SO, while conceptual and network-level
topics were the prevalent ones on SSE. CSRF and File-
related SVs are increasing on both SO and SSE.
C. RQ3: What are the Popular and Difficult SV Topics on
Q&A Sites?
As shown in Fig. 4, the popularity and difficulty of the
thirteen topics found in RQ2 were different between SO
and SSE. Regarding the topic popularity, Brute-force/Timing
attacks (T13) and Vulnerability Theory (T12) were the most
popular topics on SO and SSE, respectively. Despite being
the second most popular topic on SSE with only 2% less than
T12, T13 only had 1.35% posts on this site. Likewise, T12 did
not have the highest proportion of posts (share metric) on SO.
Conversely, General Memory Errors (T10) had the most posts
on SO in RQ2, but it was the least popular topic. We confirmed
no significant correlation between the topic popularity and
share metric with Kendall’s Tau correlation test [54] at a 95%
confidence level. These findings suggest that share metric is
not an effective measure for the topic popularity since it does
not consider user’s participation and interaction on Q&A sites.
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TABLE VI
PROPORTION (SHARE METRIC) OF THE SV TOPICS AND THEIR TRENDS OVER TIME ON SO AND SSE (IN PARENTHESES). NOTES: THE TRENDS OF SO
ARE THE TOP SOLID SPARKLINES, WHILE THE TRENDS OF SSE ARE THE BOTTOM DASHED SPARKLINES. UNIT OF PROPORTION: %.
Share T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13
Proportion 1.51 11.3 5.54 10.1 2.93 4.33 1.68 11.4 1.40 22.9 8.14 7.68 1.21(8.44) (4.42) (3.42) (5.33) (3.91) (0.53) (7.54) (0.43) (9.09) (2.97) (8.22) (32.7) (1.36)
Trends
TABLE VII
GENERAL EXPERTISE IN TERMS OF AVERAGE REPUTATION OF EACH TOPIC ON SO AND SSE (IN PARENTHESES). NOTES: THE VALUES WERE
NORMALIZED BY THE MAX AND MIN VALUES OF EACH CATEGORY. T8 OF SSE WAS REMOVED SINCE IT HAD ONLY ONE POST WITH ACCEPTED ANSWER.
General expertise T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13
Reputation 0.02(0.21)
0.95
(0.08)
0.00
(0.00)
0.22
(0.21)
0.44
(0.17)
0.90
(0.73)
0.56
(0.86)
0.49
(–)
0.05
(0.26)
0.62
(0.42)
0.88
(0.26)
0.52
(0.35)
1.00
(1.00)
Brute-force / Timing Attacks (T13)
Vulnerability Theory (T12)
Cross-site Scripting (T11)
General Memory Errors (T10)
Network Attacks (T9)
Resource Leaks (T8)
Encryption Errors (T7)
Synchronisation Errors (T6)
File-Related Vulnerabilities (T5)
Cross-site Request Forgery (T4)
Vulnerability Testing (T3)
SQL Injection (T2)
Malwares (T1)
0.68
0.46
0.58
0.02
0.77
0.72
0.25
0.40
0.60
0.82
1.00
0.00
0.83
1.00
0.72
0.44
0.09
0.04
0.38
0.28
0.56
0.18
0.59
0.25
0.54
0.00
0.56
0.76
0.80
0.85
0.62
0.00
0.61
0.40
0.78
0.82
1.00
0.98
0.84
0.98
1.00
0.55
0.59
0.61
0.00
0.75
0.82
0.41
0.73
0.10
0.84
0.45
Difficulty (SO) Popularity (SO) Difficulty (SSE) Popularity (SSE)
Fig. 4. Popularity and difficulty of thirteen topics on SO and SSE. Note: The
values were normalized by the max and min values of each category.
Regarding the topic difficulty, the most difficult topics were
not popular or associated with many posts, i.e., Vulnerability
Testing (T3) and Malwares (T1) on SO as well as T3 and
SQL Injection (T2) on SSE. The highest difficulty of T3 was
potentially caused by the low familiarity with a wide array of
vendors and tools available for SV testing. Some topics with
many posts (high share metric) like General Memory Errors
(T10) and SQL Injection (T2) were the easiest ones on SO
despite being significantly more difficult on SSE. Resource
Leaks (T8) was the least difficult topic on SSE, but it was
not the dominant topic with only nine posts. These numbers
suggest that it may be better to ask the topics T2, T8 and
T10 on SO instead of SSE to obtain answers faster. However,
we did not obtain any significant correlations among the topic
difficulty, popularity and share metric on both SO and SSE
using Kendall’s Tau test [54] with a confidence level of 95%.
With the same confidence level, no significant differences in
terms of average topic-wise popularity and difficulty between
SO and SSE were recorded using non-parametric one-tailed
Mann-Whitney U-test [55].
Answers to RQ3: Brute-force/Timing Attacks and
Vulnerability Testing were the most popular and diffi-
cult SV topics on Q&A sites, respectively. It is better
to discuss SQL Injection and Memory-related SVs on
SO than SSE.
D. RQ4: Are there Experts to Answer SV Questions on Q&A
Sites?
The average general expertise (reputation) of the accepted
answerers in SV posts was 1.3 to 5.7 times higher (confirmed
with p-values  0.05 using non-parametric one-tailed Mann-
Whitney U-test [55]) than those of many other domains [17],
[33], [56]–[59]. However, the average percentage of the same
users who got accepted answer on both sites was quite
small across topics, i.e., 1% to 18%, implying not much SV
knowledge sharing between the sites. Mann-Whitney U-test
also showed that the average topic-wise reputation on SO
was higher than that of SSE with a p-value of 0.0015 <
0.05. This is expected since SO users can engage in different
topics (not only security) and many more posts. Table VII
reports the general expertise of the thirteen SV topics. On
SO, Brute-force/Timing Attacks (T13), SQL Injection (T2),
Synchronization Errors (T6) and XSS (T11) were the topics
that experienced users focused on the most. On SSE, T13 and
T6 again along with Encryption Errors (T7) were the topics
of interest for experts. In contrast, Vulnerability Testing (T3),
Malwares (T1) and Network Attacks (T9) on SO did not attract
as much attention from experienced users, suggesting why
these topics were the most difficult ones in RQ3. On SSE,
T3 was also the topic of the least interest to experts. Overall,
experienced users on Q&A sites tended to favor the topics
with high popularity and low difficulty, which were confirmed
with p-values < 0.05 using Kendall’s Tau test [54].
We also study the type of SV knowledge that answerers
of SV-related questions commonly possess on Q&A websites.
Fig. 5 shows the correlation between the pairs of the question
topics and answerer’s knowledge (see Eq. (5)). The most
frequent user’s SV knowledge was Vulnerability Theory (T12).
On SSE, T12 was predominant for every question topic. On
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Fig. 5. Specific expertise with correlations between SV questions and user’s
knowledge. Notes: Light to dark color shows weak to strong correlation. The
values were normalized by the max and min values of each question topic.
SO, besides T12, users specialized in Memory-related Errors
(T8 and T10) also answered the questions of other SV topics.
These patterns might be because of the prevalence (RQ2) of
topics T8 and T10 on SO as well as T12 on SSE. Conversely,
Malwares (T1), Network Attacks (T9) and Brute-force/Timing
Attacks (T13) on SO as well as Synchronization Errors (T6),
Resource Leaks (T8) and T13 on SSE were unique answerer
topics and mostly used to answer the same question topics.
This is reasonable given their low topic proportions in RQ2.
Furthermore, on SO, most answerers were relevant for each
SV topic (dark color on the diagonal in Fig. 5a), but it was
not always the case on SSE (see Fig. 5b). Such results suggest
that the answerers on SO had more diverse SV knowledge than
those on SSE.
Answers to RQ4: SV expertise was higher than other
domains, but experts usually answered more popular
and less difficult SV topics. SV expertise on SO was
higher and more diverse than SSE. Memory errors on
SO and Vulnerability Theory on SSE were common
answerers’ SV knowledge.
E. RQ5: What Types of Answers are Given to SV Questions
on Q&A Sites?
Our open card sorting process in RQ5 identified seven
answer categories of SV discussion on Q&A sites (see Ta-
ble VIII). Some answer types provide experience (DC/Co and
Er) or language/platform-specific support (AT, ES and CS),
which is hardly found on formal security sources. We then
compared such answer types with the question categories of
Treude et al. [41]. We did not include “Non-functional” and
“Noise” question types since our posts were all related to
security (non-functional requirement), and only the accepted
(relevant) answers were selected for the RQ5 analysis, respec-
tively. We found some reasonable matches, e.g., (dis)agreeing
(DC/Co) with a decision (Decision Help) and providing differ-
ent solutions to resolve unexpected situations (Discrepancy).
Discrepancy and Error were also among the most frequent
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Fig. 6. Percentage of answer type for SV questions on Q&A sites.
question types, suggesting that our posts were about (security)
issues/errors.
Regarding the distribution of answer types (see Fig. 6),
Action to Take (AT) and External Sources (ES) were the most
common answer types on SO and SSE, respectively; whereas,
Self-Answer (SA) was the least frequent one on both sites. We
also noticed that both sites usually referred to external sources
(ES). The most common sources included Wikipedia, other
posts (e.g., related answers), GitHub, product documentation
(e.g., PHP, MySQL and Android) and security sources. It
is noted that SSE suggested more diverse security sources
(e.g., OWASP, CVE Details [60], Exploit-DB [61] and CWE)
than SO (i.e., only OWASP). In overall, the answers for SV
problems on SO were more technical, i.e., providing detailed
instructions (AT) and/or code samples (CS), while SSE tended
to share more experience (DC/Co and Ex) to help. For exam-
ple, SO highlighted steps (AT) to fix Malwares (T1), General
Memory Errors (T10) and XSS (T11) as well as code snippets
for SQL Injection (T2), while SSE gave more relevant sources
and explanations for such topics. Therefore, we recommend
asking technical SV questions that involve debugging errors
on SO and conceptual/opinion-based questions on SSE.
Answers to RQ5: We elicited seven answer types for
SV questions. SO gave technical instructions and code,
while SSE provided more explanatory and theoretical
answers.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Implications of Our Study
Researchers. We have identified different types of SVs being
discussed, for which researchers can develop robust detec-
tion/fixing methods, especially the popular and increasing
ones like Brute-force/Timing Attacks and CSRF. We have
also discovered that difficult topics did not attract much
attention from experienced users on Q&A sites. This opens
up opportunities for researchers to propose some content-
based metrics to quantify the post/topic difficulty as well as
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TABLE VIII
ANSWER TYPES OF SV DISCUSSION IDENTIFIED ON Q&A WEBSITES. NOTE: AN ANSWER CAN CONTAIN MORE THAN ONE TYPE OF SOLUTIONS.
Answer type of SV dis-
cussion
Description Top-3 related question types [41]
(Dis-)Confirmation
(DC/Co)
Confirm/agree or refute/disagree with a major point or concept made by the asker Decision Help, How-to, Review
Explanation (Ex) Explain concepts/definitions and “why” to take certain actions Discrepancy, Decision Help, How-to
Error (Er) Point out an error in the source code or another attachment of the initial question Discrepancy, Error, How-to
Action to Take (AT) Describe steps or explain “how” these steps can solve a problem Discrepancy, How-to, Error
External Source (ES) Provide reference/link to external source(s) Discrepancy, How-to, Decision Help
Code Sample (CS) Provide an explicit example of code snippet Discrepancy, Error, How-to
Self-Answer (SA) Answer given by the same user who submitted the question Discrepancy, Error, How-to
alternative incentives to motivate experts to tackle such chal-
lenging questions. Lastly, we have identified some mechanisms
being used to answer SV questions. However, the reliability
of answers still remains unexplored. If the given solutions are
flawed (e.g., obsolete links [62] or vulnerable code [63]) yet
integrated, asker’s software systems would be exposed to many
dangerous security threats.
Practitioners. We encourage experienced software developers
and security experts to help out more on difficult SV topics,
especially the vulnerability scanning and testing tools to detect
malwares as well as CSRF. CSRF and File-related vulnera-
bilities are also on the increase; thus, developers should pay
more attention to these SVs during design, development and
maintenance of their software systems. Moreover, we suggest
that practitioners should not expect to find updated information
related to new/zero-day SVs on SO and SSE. Instead, they
can discuss how to fix/identify known SVs on SO and ask
general/theoretical questions about security issues on SSE.
Lastly, we recommend developers always double-check and
properly test given solutions before integrating into production
code.
B. Threats to Validity
The first threat is with our data collection. We might have
missed some SV-related posts on SO and SSE. It is hard to
guarantee completeness without exhaustive manual validation,
which is nearly impossible with nearly 70k posts. The selected
posts were also checked by three of the authors.
The thirteen SV topics found can be of concern as well.
We do not claim that these are the only SV topics, but
after the manual validation and comparison with the existing
taxonomies, the identified topics are the dominant ones on SO
and SSE. In addition, the taxonomy of answers proposed in
RQ5 may not be perfect, but we did examine a sample of
significant size [39] and cross-check with three of the authors.
The generalizability of our study is another threat. The
patterns we found may not be the same for other Q&A sites
and domains. However, the reported patterns for SV discussion
on SO and SSE were at least confirmed significant using
statistical tests with p-values < 0.05. We also released our
code and data at [22] for reuse and extension to other domains.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Topic Modeling on Q&A Websites
Q&A websites like Stack Overflow (SO) contain a large
number of discussion posts. Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) [21] has been commonly used to extract the taxon-
omy/topics of different domains from such posts. In 2014,
a seminal work of Barua et al. [33] discovered the topics
of all posts on SO. They also found that LDA managed to
identify more robust topics than the tagging system on SO.
Subsequently, many other studies have used LDA to analyze
discussions of specific domains, e.g., security [17], mobile
computing [59], concurrent computing [42], machine learn-
ing [58], deep learning [56] and big data [34]. However, these
existing studies did not investigate the expertise and types of
answers. Moreover, despite having some overlapping topics
with Yang et al. [17], our work focused more on vulnerabilities
of security implementation/maintenance on both SO and SSE.
For example, we have found CSRF is an fast-growing type of
SVs, which was missed in [17].
B. Security Vulnerability Analytics Using Open Sources
Security vulnerability analytics have long been of interest
to researchers. In 2006, Frei et al. [64] were among the first
to study the life cycle of SVs using open-source security
advisories. After that, using various security sources, Shahzad
et al. [3], [65] conducted a large-scale study to investigate
the phases, evolution, functionalities, risk score (CVSS [28]),
exploitation, vendors and products of reported SVs. There
is another active research trend to build prediction models
to analyze SVs. In 2010, Bozorgi et al. [66] predicted the
likelihood and time of SV exploitation using Support Vec-
tor Machine. Since then, there have been many studies on
building/improving Machine Learning (e.g., [67]–[69]) and
Deep Learning (e.g., [5], [70], [71]) models to predict the
characteristics of SVs using formal security sources (e.g.,
CVE, NVD and CWE). There is a recent study [72] on
predicting GitHub activities using formal security mentions
on social media like Twitter and Reddit. However, to the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to perform vulnerability
analytics on developer Q&A sites, namely SO and SSE.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
Through a large-scale study of 67,864 posts on SO and
SSE, we have unveiled the mysteries of SV discussion on
11
Q&A sites. We first showed that these sites did not align
with the SV categorization and patterns of security sources.
Thus, we used LDA to devise thirteen commonly discussed
SV topics on Q&A sites. Among these topics, we discovered
the popular (e.g., Brute-force/Timing Attacks) and difficult
(e.g., Vulnerability Testing) ones. The expertise for SV topics
was high, but the knowledge sharing between the sites was
still limited, and some topics (e.g., Vulnerability Testing and
Malwares) required more attention from experts. Moreover,
memory-related knowledge was widely available on SO, while
Vulnerability Theory was commonly known on SSE. We also
identified seven answer types to SV questions on Q&A sites,
in which SO offered more “how-to” solutions, while replies on
SSE targeted more “what” and “why” questions. Overall, Q&A
sites do support SV discussion, but there is a fair disconnection
between SO and SSE, and more effort is required to motivate
similar engagement in difficult topics as in popular ones. Our
findings would support researchers and practitioners with their
SV knowledge acquisition and sharing to develop and maintain
secure software.
In the future, we plan to correlate the findings of SV
discussion on Q&A sites with the vulnerability detection and
fixing activities on version control systems such as GitHub.
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